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Abstract
This paper develops a unified structure to examine the interrelationships between current account, foreign investment and domestic capital accumulation. In particular, we develop a twocountry, two-period model with international mobility of both physical and financial capital, and
endogenous domestic capital accumulation. We consider cases where (i) current account is endogenous, but foreign investments are exogenous, and (ii) current account is exogenous, but foreign
investments are endogenous. For (i), we examine how inflow and outflow of foreign physical capital
affects current account and domestic investments. For the second case, we examine how an increase
in current account deficit affects foreign investments.

JEL Classification: F2, F3, F4.
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Introduction

Current account imbalances in both developed and developing countries have been receiving a lot of
attention lately. We observe a large current account deficit in the United States and a huge current
account surpluses in Japan, Euro area, China and other Asian countries. Currency crises resulting
from unsustainable current account deficit in East Asia in 1997, in Russia, and in a number of
Latin American countries more recently put the obvious research question to the forefront: what
are the sources of these worldwide current account imbalances? And, as one would expect a lot has
been written. For example, in attempts to explain these large current account imbalances some
reexamined the twin deficit theory with emphasis on budget deficit (Corsetti, 2006), while others
suggest that “savings glut” in the world is the source of this imbalance (Bernanke, 2005).1,2
However, the sources of current account imbalances are not the same for all countries and
the thresholds for maintaining a current account imbalance are different for different countries.
The large and persistent trade deficit of the US has generated a debate about the sustainability
of such a deficit. Some argue that the U.S. economy might be heading for a hard landing with a
financial crisis (see, for example, Edwards, 2005; Obstfeld and Rogoff, 2004). Obstfeld and Rogoff
(2004) even suggested an exogenously imposed reduction of current account imbalance for the U.S.
to achieve a relatively painless adjustment to a more sustainable level of current account imbalance.
Others argue that the present large current account deficit in the U.S. is not a cause of concern as
it is the manifestation of strength of the economy, since a large amount of capital is now flowing out
of the countries with low investment and growth and into the US and other fast growing countries
(see, for example, Backus et al., 2005). Savings glut in Asian countries like China and Korea and
in oil-rich Middle Eastern countries results in a huge inflow of capital into the US and thus the
current account balance of the U.S. is in disarray (Bernanke, 2005; Snow, 2006). According to
these researchers and policy makers, the huge inflow of capital into the U.S. is the main source of
its massive current account deficit.
1

Barnanke (2005) argued that the recent decline in the long-run interest rate is a sign of this savings glut.
Another group of researchers put focus on the role of demographic transition in developing and developed countries
in generating this imbalance (Domeij and Floden, 2005; Ferrero, 2005).
2
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On the other hand, in the mid 1990s, many developing countries in Latin America and
Asia were at the receiving end of significant capital inflow which were allegedly not always used
productively. The loss of lender confidence due to poor financial infrastructure and overvalued fixed
exchange rates, inter alia, created an unsustainable current account deficit (Bernanke, 2005). This
current account deficit resulted in a huge outflow of capital and also in some cases a full-blown
currency crisis. Thus, the argument is that while in the U.S. an inflow of foreign capital caused
deficit in the current account,3 in other countries such as those in Latin America a deficit in the
current account caused a large outflow of foreign capital. Thus, the direction in the causality of the
relationship between current account deficit and movements of foreign capital can go both ways,
and it is important that in analyzing the relationship between capital flow and current account one
is clear about the endogeniety or otherwise of current account adjustments.4
This paper is an attempt to examine the relationship between capital inflow and current
account deficit in a two period two country model with an emphasis on endogeneity of current
account adjustments. Given the discussions above, we consider a number of variations in our model
depending on whether balance of payment affects capital inflow (which is generally a characteristic
of a developing country) or whether capital inflow causes balance of payment deficit (which is
generally a characteristic of a developed country). Our model is simple but general enough to yield
a clear relationship between capital inflow and current account. For example, when foreign capital
inflows are exogenous, as suggested by some to be the case of the U.S., present and future foreign
investments may have completely opposite effects on the current account. However, when current
account balance is exogenous, as in the case of small developing open economies, an expansion
of the threshold of current account deficit increases the level of future inward foreign investment
when the degree of complementarity between domestic and foreign capital is very large, but will
have no effect on the level of contemporaneous foreign investment. Furthermore, in the absence of
of complementarity between domestic and foreign capital, an increase in current account deficit in
3

For a recent attempt related to the U.S. current account deficit see Engel and Rogers (2006).
Debelle and Galati (2005) argue that the literature does not clearly identify whether the current account adjustments are endogenous or exogenous. Their empirical findings suggests that current account adjustments in developed
countries are endogenous event. Chinn and Prasad (2003) found that developed and developing countries adjust
current account imbalances very differently.
4
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a country unambiguously reduces the inflow of foreign capital into that country, as in the case of
many Latin American countries in the 1990s.
There is a second related issue that we analyze in this paper, and it is the relationship
between capital inflow/outflow and capital accumulation or domestic investment. Recently, Lane
and Milesi-Ferretti (2006) found that foreign investment accounts for about 75 percent of developing
countries equity liabilities. They also found that the correlation between current account and
changes in net foreign assets for the period 1971-2004 for the industrial countries is 0.41 while the
same figure for the emerging market economies is 0.66.
Mody and Murshid (2005), using a more recent data, report that the extent of the positive effect of incoming foreign investment on domestic investment becomes weaker as countries
liberalized their capital account. They contend that the inability to absorb external capital is a
limiting factor in developing countries. However, they found that on average each dollar of longrun capital flow raised domestic investment by 66 cents in their sample of 60 developing countries.
Moreover, the surge of capital flows to emerging market economies during the 1990s was driven by
diversification motive, they argued. If the marginal returns to capital are high in relation to world
interest rate, substantial capital inflow will induce domestic investment and this will generate a
strong positive relationship between foreign capital flows and domestic investment. Blanchard and
Giavazzi (2002) observed this relationship in Greece and Portugal in the context of their joining
the European Monetary Union. However, if an economy opens up for capital inflow but domestic
returns are low or no higher than the world interest rate, foreign capital might come into a country
due to diversification motive of the capital owners (Kraay and Ventura, 1999) and then we should
not expect foreign capital to boost domestic investment.
On the other hand, using a larger cross-section of OECD countries, Desai et al. (2005)
confirmed the Feldstein’s (1995) finding that outward foreign investment reduce domestic capital
formation almost dollar for dollar. However, a time-series data of the U.S. multinational firms
yield a complementary relationship between outflow of foreign investment and domestic capital
accumulation. An additional dollar of foreign capital expenditure is associated with 3.9 dollars of
3

domestic capital expenditures for U.S. multinationals. They argue that this contradictory evidence
may be due to a number of issues including omitted variable bias. The authors believe that the
U.S. time-series evidence is more reliable than that obtained from the OECD cross-section data.
Firm level study by Desai et al. (2004) also provides support to the complementary relationship
between the outflow of foreign investment and domestic investment.
In this paper foreign capital has been treated as a complementary input and thus increases
the marginal productivity of domestic capital. Since the level of domestic investment depends on
the marginal productivity of capital in period 2, foreign investment in period 2 increases domestic
capital formation. This is the direct positive effect of foreign investment in period 2 on domestic
investment. We also identify a second indirect channel via which foreign investment in period 2
affects domestic investment, and this operates via changes in the interest or discount rate. This
indirect effect via the interest rate is shown to reduce domestic investment unambiguously. Thus,
foreign investment in period 2 may as well reduce domestic investment. As for the effect of period
1 foreign investment, the indirect effect is the only effect that is present, and we derive a necessary
and sufficient condition for foreign investments in period 1 to reduce the interest rate and thus
increase domestic investment.
The layout of the paper is as follows. The following section starts with the derivation of
our basic framework for analysis. After the setting up of the basic model, It is then divided into
two subsections. In subsection 2.1 current account is endogenous, but foreign investments are
exogenous. In contrast, in subsection 2.2, foreign investments are endogenous but the host country
of foreign investment faces a binding current account constraint. There we examine how the levels
of foreign investments are affected by the relaxation of the current account constraint.

2

The Basic Framework of Analysis

We consider two countries - labeled a and b, each with a two-period horizon, indexed by t = 1, 2
respectively. They produce a single good per period. The price of the good is normalized to unity,
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and ρi is the discounted value of one unit of the good in period 2 in terms of the period-1 price in
country a. Goods are labeled 1 and 2 respectively, depending on the period of production. Country
i (i = a, b) has an endowment of capital K̄ i in period 1 and invests I i in that period making
the endowment of capital K̄ i + I i in period 2.5 In addition to domestic capital, country a receives
foreign investment from country b in each period and the amounts in periods 1 and 2 are F1 and F2
respectively. We assume that foreign capital and domestic capital are non-homogeneous in country
a.
The production side of country a in periods 1 and 2 are represented by the revenue functions
R1a (K̄ a , F1 ) and R2a (K̄ a +I a , F2 ) respectively, and that of country b in the two periods are R1b (K̄ b −
F1 ) and R2b (K̄ b + I b − F2 ).6 We assume that domestic capital and foreign capital are complements
in Country a.7 Formally,

Assumption 1

ia ≥ 0,
R12

i = 1, 2.

Furthermore, since we assume that there are factors of production other than the two types
of capital in country a (see footnote 6), we also have
2a 2a
2a 2
∆1 = R11
R22 − (R12
) > 0.

(1)

The consumption sides of the two countries are given by the two inter-temporal expenditure
functions E a (1, ρa , ua ) and E b (1, ρb , ub ) where ua and ub are the total utility of a representative
consumer in country a and b respectively.8
5

For simplicity, we rule out depreciation of capital.
All factors other than capital and contemporaneous output price (which is unity) are suppressed in the revenue
functions as they do not change in our analysis. As is well known the partial derivative of a revenue function with
respect to the price of a good gives the output supply function of that good. Similarly, the partial derivative of a
revenue function with respect to a factor endowment gives the price of that factor. The revenue functions are positive
semi-definite in prices and negative semi-definite in the endowments of the factors of production. In particular, they
ia
ib
satisfy Rjj
< 0 and R11
< 0 for j = 1, 2 and i = 1, 2. For these and other properties of revenue functions see Dixit
and Norman (1980).
7
Since most foreign investments come through joint ventures and also through mergers and acquisition of companies (Giovanni, 2005) the complementary between foreign capital inflow and domestic investment is a reasonable
assumption to make.
8
The partial derivative of an expenditure function with respect to the price of a good gives the Hicksian compensated demand function for that good. Moreover, the the matrix of second order partial derivatives of the prices, which
represent the own- and cross- price effects, is negative semi-definite. For this and other properties of expenditure
function see, for example, Dixit and Norman (1980).
6
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The budget balance equations for the representative consumers in the two countries are given
by
E a (1, ρa , ua ) + I a = R1a (K̄ a , F1 ) + ρa R2a (K̄ a + I a , F2 ) − R21a F1 − ρa R22a F2 ,
E b (1, ρb , ub ) + I b = R1b (K̄ b − F1 ) + ρb R2b (K̄ b + I b − F2 ) + R21a F1 + ρb R22a F2 ,

(2)
(3)

The left hand sides are the present value of expenditures and the right hand sides are the discounted present value of gross domestic products, and the present value of repatriated incomes.
The repatriated incomes are negative for country a and positive for country b since foreign capital
flow assumed to to be from the latter to the former.
The levels of domestic investments are determined optimally for given level of ρ and the
factor prices. Differentiating (2) and (3) and setting ∂ua /∂I a = 0 and ∂ub /∂I b = 0, we get
respectively
ρa R12a = 1,

(4)

ρb R12b = 1.

(5)

The right hand side is the marginal cost of investment (loss of consumption in period 1) and the
left hand side is present value of the marginal benefit (increased consumption in period 2).
Finally borrowing by country a, denoted by B, and lending by country b, denoted by L, in
period are defined as
B ≡ E1a + I a − (R1a − R21a F1 ),

(6)

L ≡ R1b + R21a F1 − E1b − I b ,

(7)

which are respectively the excess of expenditure over income in period 1 in country a and the
excess of income over expenditure in period 1 in country b. Note that a positive borrowing in our
framework is equivalent to a deficit in current account.
We shall assume that the rental rates of capital in country a (the recipient of foreign investment) is larger than that in country b (the source) in both periods.

6

Assumption 2

R21a > R11b

and

R22a > R12b .

The discount factors ρi , i = a, b, are determined in the market-clearing condition in the
international financial capital and they may be different in the presence of some friction in the
market. For the determination of the discount rates we shall consider two scenarios. In the first
(subsection 2.1), the levels of foreign investments are exogenous, but the international credit market
is perfect so that ρa = ρb . In the second which is taken up in subsection 2.2, we assume that country
a is subject to a current account constraint and the levels of foreign investments are endogenous.

2.1

Exogenous Foreign Investment

In this section we take F1 and F2 as exogenous and the common discount rate ρ = ρa = ρb is
determined by equation B and L defined in equations (6) and (7) respectively. That is,
E1a + I a − (R1a − R21a F1 ) = R1b + R21a F1 − E1b − I b .

(8)

We now have five equations in (2)-(5) and (8), and five endogenous variables ua , ub , I a , I b ,
and ρ.
Differentiating (2) and (3) and using (8), we get:9
Eua dua =

B
1a
2a
2a a
· dρ − F1 R22
dF1 − ρF2 R22
dF2 − ρF2 R21
dI ,
ρ

Eub dub = −

(9)

L
1a
· dρ + [R21a − R11b + F1 R22
]dF1
ρ

2a
2a a
+ [ρR22a + ρF2 R22
− 1]dF2 + ρF2 R21
dI

(10)

The first terms in (9) and (10) are the intertemporal terms-of-trade effects. An increase
in ρ (which means a decrease in the implicit interest rate) makes the borrower better off and the
lender worse off. The last three terms in (9) are due to changes in repatriated profits via changes
in the rental rates of capital: an increase in F1 reduces the rental rate in period 1 and that in
9

Since E a (·) and E b (·) are homogeneous of degree 1 in the prices (1, ρ), one can derive that B = ρ[R2a −E2a −R22a F2 ]
and −L = ρ[R2b − E2b + R22b F2 ]. These two expression have been used to simplify the following two equation.
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either F2 or I a reduces the rental rate of capital in period 2. An increase in F1 has two effects on
the utility level in country b. First, it reduces utility because of a reduction in repatriated income
1a ). Second, it increases utility as it commands a larger rental rate in country a
in period 1 (F1 R22

than in country b (R21a − R11b ). F2 has similar two effects on ub . Finally, an increase in I a reduces
repatriated profits in period 2 and thus welfare in country b.10
As for the effects on the levels of domestic investments, differentiating (4) and (5), we get
dI a = −

2a
R12a
R12
·
dρ
−
2a
2a · dF2 ,
ρR11
R11

(11)

dI b = −

R12b
· dρ + dF2 .
2b
ρR11

(12)

An increase in ρ raises the marginal benefit of domestic investments and thus the levels of it
in the two countries. An increase in F2 raises the rental rate of domestic capital in country a as the
two types of capital are assumed to be complements (assumption 1) and thus the marginal benefit
of domestic investment. Thus an increase in an inward foreign investment stimulates domestic
investment. An outward foreign investment from country b, i.e., an increase in F2 raises the rental
rate of capital there and thus the level of domestic investment. Note that F1 affects domestic
investments only via changes in the discount rate.
For determining the effects on the discount parameter ρ, we differentiate (8) and use (9)-(12)
to obtain




R11b
1a
1a
1b
1a 1a
1b
1a
∆ dρ = R2 (cy − cy ) −22 + 1 − 1a + (1 − cy )(R2 − R1 ) dF1
R2
"
#
1b
2a
ρF2 ∆1 (c1a
R
y − cy )
2a
12
+
− c1b
y (ρR2 − 1) +
2a
2a − 1 dF2 ,
R11
R11

(13)

where
c1a
y =

a
E1u
,
Eua

c1b
y =

a
b
+ E12
+
∆ = E12

b
E1u
,
Eub

1a
22 = −

∂R21a F1
·
∂F1 R21a

1b
2a
B(c1a
R12
R12a
R12b
y − cy )
1b
)
·
+ F2 R12a (c1a
−
−
−
c
y
y
2a
2a
2b
ρ
R11
ρR11
ρR11

10
Note that the direct effects of I a and I b on ua and ub are absent as these two are optimally chosen (the Envelope
property).

8

c1i
y is the marginal propensity to spend in period 1 in country i (i = a, b), and ∆ is the slope of the
uncompensated excess demand for loan function with respect to ρ. Since ρ varies inversely with
the implicit interest rate, ∆ has to be positive for the Walrasian stability of the international credit
market.
As mentioned before, an increase in F1 increases income in country a in period 1 and reduces
it in country b via changes in repatriated income, and the magnitude of this effect is given by the
size of 1a
22 . The former effect would reduces demand for loan and the latter would reduce supply
1a
1b 1a
of loan. The magnitude of these two effects depends on the sizes of (1 − c1a
y )22 and (1 − cy )22

respectively. The demand-side and the supply-side effects on equilibrium value of ρ are conflicting,
1b
and the net effect on ρ is positive if and only if c1a
y < cy . An increase in F1 also increases income

in country b as R21a > R11b . This would increase the supply of loan and thus the equilibrium value
1b
1a
1b
1a
of ρ. The overall net effect on ρ is positive if (c1a
y − cy )(1 − 22 − R1 /R2 ) > 0. An increase in F2

also changes income in the two countries via reduction in repatriated profits in period 2, and the
1b
net effect of it on the equilibrium value of ρ once again is positive if and only if c1a
y < cy . Like F1 ,

F2 also increases income in country b as the rental rate of foreign capital in country a in period 2
(R22a ) is larger that the rental rate of capital in country b in the same period (R12b ), the latter being
equal to 1/ρ (see (5)). Finally, an increase F2 increases domestic investments in both countries and
this reduces the demand for loan in country a and reduces the supply of loan in country b. The
effect on the equilibrium ρ is negative and is given by the last two terms in the coefficient of dF2
in (13).
We now make the further assumption that the propensity to spend in period 1 is higher in
the foreign investment receiving country than in the source country. That is:

Assumption 3

1b
c1a
y > cy .

From assumptions (1)-(3), it follows that a sufficient condition for an increase in F1 to

9

1b
1a
increase ρ is that 1a
22 + R1 /R2 < 1, and that in F2 always reduces ρ. That is,

∂ρ
>0
∂F1

if

1a
22 +

R11b
< 1,
R21a

∂ρ
< 0.
∂F2

(14)

The effect on an inward shift in the demand for loan curve (due to an increase in F1 ) outweigh the
1b
1a
shift to the left of the supply of loan curve if 1a
22 + R1 /R2 < 1, reducing the interest rate (or,

increasing the discount factor). As discussed after (13), an increase in F2 shifts the demand for
loan curve outward, but the supply for loan function could shift either to the left or to the right,
and if c1b
y is not very large the supply function would in fact shift to the left. Under our assumption
1b
that c1a
y > cy , the net effect on the discount factor of an increase in F2 is always negative.

From (11), (12) and (14), it follows that an increase in F1 increases domestic investments
1b
1a
in both countries if 1a
22 + R1 /R2 < 1 as in this case the direct effect and the terms-of-trade effect

work in the same direction. However, the effects of an increase in F2 has two opposite effects: the
direct effects increase domestic investments, but the indirect effects via changes in the intertemporal
terms of trade reduces the levels of domestic investments. In general the net effect is ambiguous,
but the terms-of-trade effect will be large if, for example, c1b
y ' 0 and the intertemporal substitution
a ) is large, in which case an increase in F will reduce the
effect in consumption in country a (E12
2

levels of domestic investments. Formally,

Proposition 1 An increase in the level of foreign investment in the first period increases the levels
1b
1a
of domestic investment in both countries if 1a
22 + R1 /R2 < 1. An increase in foreign investment

in the second period may or may not increase domestic investments, and will reduce domestic
a
investments if the terms of trade effect is strong, which is the case when c1b
y ' 0 and E12 >> 0.

As mentioned in the introduction, Desai et al. (2005) observe a positive relationship between
an outflow of capital and domestic investment while examining time-series data of U.S. multinational firms; but cross-section data from OECD countries yield a negative relationship between
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the two variables. Mody and Murshid (2005) found a complementary relationship between capital
inflow and domestic investment. All these results can be nested in our model with different assumptions about (a) the degree of complementarity between domestic and foreign capital, (b) the
strength of the terms of trade effect, and (c) the timing of foreign capital inflow.
Finally, in order to examine the effect of increased international mobility of physical capital
on the mobility of financial capital or borrowing, we differentiate the left hand side of (8), we obtain
"

2a
c1a
R12a
R12
y B
a
dB = E12
+
−
+ F2 R12a c1a
·
y
2a
2a
ρ
R11
ρR11
1a
+ F1 R22
(1 − c1a
y ) dF1 −

#
dρ

(15)

2a
ρF2 c1a
y ∆1 + R12
dF2 .
2a
R11

There are two opposite effects on the equilibrium amount of borrowing. An increase in F1
reduces the demand for loan (for a given level of ρ) by increasing period-1 income, but increases the
1b
1a
amount of borrowing by reducing the interest rate (increasing the discount factor) if 1a
22 +R1 /R2 <

1. An increase in F2 on the other hand, increases the demand for loan (for a given level of ρ) by
increasing period-2 income, but reduces the amount of borrowing by increasing the interest rate.
That is, when the terms-of-trade effect is not strong, borrowing will go down with an increase in
period-1 foreign investment, but will go up with an increase in period-2 foreign investment. When,
on the other hand, the terms-of-trade effect is strong, borrowing may go up with an increase in
period-1 foreign investment, but may go down with an increase in period-2 foreign investment.
That is, the qualitative effect of a change in foreign investment on the level of borrowing may
depend whether the foreign investment is contemporaneous or in the future. Note that the terms
a
of trade effect will be strong when c1b
y ' 0 and E12 >> 0.

Proposition 2 Period-1 and period-2 foreign investments may have completely opposite qualitative effects on the level of current account deficit.

The large current account deficit (borrowing) resulting from exogenous capital inflow into
the U.S., as suggested by Bernanke (2005) and Snow (2006), can be easily derived from our model
11

provided we consider the inflow of capital to be contemporaneous and the terms-of-trade effect be
strong. However, if the terms-of-trade effect is weak their suggestion may not hold. The effect
of future foreign investment is just the opposite: their suggestion would hold for future foreign
investment if the terms-of-trade effect is weak, but not if it is strong.

2.2

Current account constraint

In this section we assume that country a is subject to a current account (borrowing) constraint. In
other words, the the level of borrowing defined in (6) is exogenously given at the level B̄. That is,
E1a + I a − (R1a − R21a F1 ) = B̄.

(16)

Because of this constraint, which we shall assume to be binding, there will be a wedge between
the discount rates in the two countries, and in particular we shall have ρa < ρb . The loan supply
function defined in (7) is then also restricted by
R1b + R21a F1 − E1b − I b = B̄.

(17)

Furthermore, the levels of foreign investments in the two periods are determined by equating the
rates of return in the two countries in the two periods separately, i.e.,
R21a = R11b ,

(18)

R22a = R12b ,

(19)

Finally, domestic investments in the two countries are determined as before from (4) and
(5) which are repeated here for the sake of completion:
ρa R12a = 1,

(4a)

ρb R12b = 1.

(5a)

The source of the current account constraint can be a number of agents in our model. It
can represent a control on the inflow of financial foreign capital imposed by government in the
borrowing country (country a). It can also represent a control of the outflow of financial imposed
12

by the government in the lending country (country b). Finally, it can be imposed by the private
banking sector in the lending country.11 In this paper we shall leave the interpretation open and
simply write equations (16) and (17) as
B(ρa ) = B̄,

(20)

L(ρb ) = B̄,

(21)

where B(·) and L(·) are respectively the compensated loan demand and loan supply functions with
B 0 > 0 and L0 < 0.12
The endogenous variables in this model which are I a , I b , ρa , ρb , F1 and F2 and these are
solved from the six equations in (18)-(21). Under this framework, we shall analyze the effects of
a relaxation of the current account constraint on the levels of domestic investments in the two
countries I a and I b , and foreign investments in the two periods F1 and F2 .
First of all from (18) it is evident that a change in B̄ will have no effect on the level of
foreign investment in period 1. That is,
dF1
= 0.
dB̄
Differentiating (4a) and (5a), we get
dI a = −

2a
R12a
R12
a
·
dρ
−
· dF2 ,
2a
2a
ρa R11
R11

(22)

dI b = −

R12b
· dρb + dF2 .
2b
ρb R11

(23)

The explanations are similar to those of (11) and (12).
Finally, differentiating (19)-(21) and using (19), (20) and (21), we get:
dρa
1
= 0 > 0,
B
dB̄
dρb
1
= 0 < 0,
L
dB̄
 2a

∆1
dF2
R22a
21
1
,
2a ) · dB̄ = B̄ · 2a  − 
(−R11
L
11 B
11
12

See Jafarey and Lahiri (2004) for a micro-foundation of the borrowing constraint.
Note that the discount factors are inversely related to the interest rates.
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(24)
(25)
(26)

where
2a
21 =

a
a
K̄ a + I a
∂R22a
2a K̄ + I
·
=
R
·
≥ 0,
21
R22a
R22a
∂ K̄ a + I a

2a
11 = −
B =

a
a
∂R12a
K̄ a + I a
2a K̄ + I
·
=
−R
·
> 0,
11
R12a
R12a
∂ K̄ a + I a

ρa
∂B ρa
0
·
=
B
·
> 0,
∂ρa B
B̄

L = −

ρb
∂L ρb
0
·
= −L ·
> 0.
b
∂ρ L
B̄

(27)

(28)
(29)

(30)

An increase in B̄ affects F2 via changes in I a and I b . An increase in I a increases the marginal
productivity of F2 in country a since domestic and foreign capital are assumed to be complementary
(see assumption 1), and therefore the level of inward foreign investment. An increase in I b reduces
the rate of return on capital in country b and therefore encourages the level of outward investment
from country b. Since an increase in B̄ reduces ρa and increases ρb and an increase in the discount
rate in a country is related positively with the level of domestic investment in that country, the
net effect of an in increase in B̄ on the level of foreign investment in period 2 (F2 ) is in general
ambiguous as can be seen from (26). However, it is also clear from (26) that an increase in B̄ will
increase F2 is the degree of complementarity between domestic and foreign capital in country a,
represented by the elasticity 2a
21 is sufficiently high. Intuitively, if the degree of complementarity
is high, then an inflow of foreign capital in period 2 increases domestic investment in country a
significantly increasing the demand for loan by a large amount. On the other hand, if the degree
of complementarity domestic and foreign capital is very low , i.e., 2a
21 ' 0, then an increase in B̄
(the the level of current account deficit in country a) unambiguously reduces the inflow of foreign
capital there.
Turning to the effects of domestic investments, first of all note from (22) that if 2a
21 is
sufficiently high for F2 to increase with B̄, the level of domestic investment in country a (I a ) will
also increase with B̄, but the effect on I b is still ambiguous since F2 and ρb move in the opposite
direction. An increase in F2 (outflow of capital from country b) increases the rate of return on
capital in country b and thus the level of investment in that country. However, a decrease in ρb
14

would reduce I b . However, one can show that if 2a
21 is very large then the former effect will dominate
the latter one, and an increase in B̄ will also increase I b . Furthermore, if 2a
21 ' 0, an increase in B̄
unambiguously reduces F2 . These results are summarized in the following proposition.

Proposition 3 An increase in current account deficit in country a increases the level of inward foreign investment in that country in period 2 and the levels of domestic investments in both countries
if the degree of complementarity between domestic and foreign capital in country a is sufficiently
high, and it has no effect on the level of foreign investment in period 1. If the degree of complementarity between domestic and foreign capital in country a is zero, an increase in current account
deficit there unambiguously reduces the inflow of foreign capital into that country.

To summarize, we find that when the degree of complementarity between domestic and
foreign capital is high, the relationship between the inflow of financial and physical capital is
a positive one. Also, under the same condition, the endogenous relationship between domestic
investment and inward foreign investment and that between domestic investment and outward
foreign investment (both induced by an exogenous increase in the flow of financial capital) are
positive.
As mentioned in the introduction, it is widely believed that a large current account deficit
in some countries in Latin America in the 1990s, led to a significant decrease in foreign investment
in those countries. The above proposition can be reconciled with this fact provided the degree of
complementarity between domestic and foreign capital in those countries is small.
Comparing the results in subsection 2.1 (the case of exogenous foreign investments) with
those in subsection 2.2 (the case of current account constraint), we note the following interesting
contrasts. An increase in F1 does have an effect on the level of borrowing, but a change in the
level of borrowing has no effect on F1 . Similarly, the relationship between F2 and the level of
current account deficit can depend on the causality, i.e., which one is exogenous and which one is
endogenous. Finally, the relationship between domestic investments and the foreign capital mobility
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depends on the nature of the foreign capital, i.e.. whether it is physical or financial ot whether
foreign investment is in period 1 or period 2.

3

Conclusion

The interrelationships between current account imbalances, foreign investment (both inward and
outward) and domestic investment have been subject to a lot of discussions in the literature. There
are two strands in the literature. One examines the relationships between current account imbalance
and foreign investment, and the second considers the relationship between domestic and foreign
investments. This paper develops a united structure to examine both issues.
As for the first relationship, the direction of causality is thought to depend on the country
one considers. For example, in countries such as the U.S., inward foreign investment is sometimes
blamed for massive current account deficit. On the other hand, in many Latin American countries
huge current account deficits appear to have caused large scale capital outflow. We deal with the
issue of causality by considering two versions of the model: one in which foreign investment is
exogenous and another in which current account deficit (or borrowing) is exogenous. In the first
case, we find the present and future foreign investments may have completely opposite effects on
current account. For the second case, an increase in current account deficit can actually increase the
inflow of future foreign investment if domestic and foreign capital are sufficiently complementary.
However, in th absence of complementarity between domestic and foreign capital, an increase in
current account deficit in a country unambiguously reduces the inflow of foreign capital into that
country.
As for the relationship between domestic and foreign investments, we derive conditions under
which present and future foreign investments increase domestic capital accumulation. The effect
of foreign investments on the interest rate, and thus on the level of domestic capital accumulation,
can go either way.
To summarize, our analysis shows that the the nature of interrelationship between current
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account deficit, foreign investment and domestic capital accumulation depends crucially on the
degree of complementarity between domestic and foreign capital and on the causality in their
relationships.
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